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Abstract 
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in 
the world. Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that 
allow for higher levels of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy 
and stability in highly divided societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 
examining the electoral system, executive type, and level of decentralization, this study first 
determines the level of institutional power-sharing for each of the 48 sub-Saharan states. Next, it 
compares these levels of power-sharing with indicators of democracy and state stability to 
determine if more power-sharing does correspond with higher levels of democracy and 
stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows a strong and 
significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of 
democracy and state stability in sub-Saharan Africa. However, power-sharing does not appear 
to be a necessary or sufficient driver of democratic outcomes. In order to better determine the 
nature of the relationship between institutional design and contextual factors, the later part of 
the study employs a focused-structured most-similar comparison between Ghana and Cote 
d’Ivoire, countries with identical and moderately low power-sharing scores but drastically 
different levels of democracy and state stability.  
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Introduction 
The Sub-Saharan region of Africa is arguably one of the most divided and conflict-prone 
regions in the world. The region is home to more than a thousand languages, and in the past 
twenty years most Sub-Saharan countries have experienced violence ranging from ethnic 
rebellions to genocide (Oppong 2006; Global Report 2009). The chronic instability and deep 
cleavages of the states in this region present comparative political scientists and institution 
crafters with a unique challenge: how to implement a democratic system that is truly 
representative and stable, that is not susceptible to failure and gives all parties involved an 
incentive to see democratic governance succeed. Early theorizing on the causes or success of 
democracy concluded that there were certain necessary prerequisites for democracy to survive 
and flourish, among these high levels of socio-economic development and a social cleavage 
structure that allowed for the formation of a common national identity, trust in state 
institutions, and a certain degree of consensus about how to resolve disputes.  As early as the 
1960s, scholars like Arend Lijphart noticed that democracy could also survive and even flourish 
in the small deeply divided societies of Western Europe (Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Belgium). He argued that in ‘consociational’ democracy, institutional design could be used to 
for consensus building, which made democratic longevity and stability possible. This insight 
drew fresh interest with the de-colonization of Africa and Asia and the formation of 
independent states in regions of the world that, according to earlier democratic theorists, 
seemed to have none of the pre-requisites or conditions necessary for democracy. Attempts at 
democracy have been tried and are being tried in many places that seem inhospitable. This has 
led to a heated debate over whether it is possible to craft democracy through institutional 
design, and if so, what types of institutions are most effective in ethnically divided and 
fragmented societies that have little or no experience with or trust in institutions and exhibit 
high levels of corruption and rent-seeking behavior among elites. Advocates of power-sharing 
arrangements (a modern version of Lijphart’s ‘consensus democracy’) argue that institutions 
such as PR electoral rules, collective or shared executives, and devolved power structures can 
alleviate tensions that exist between competing groups and give all major players a stake in the 
democratic order, even in the most divided and under developed societies.    
  Sub-Saharan Africa provides a hard test for these claims. Disputed elections in the 
region have produced violence, and tension between ethnic groups has often resulted in 
conflict, exemplified most shockingly by the genocide in Rwanda. The resurgence of violence is 
often a concern to both policy makers within these states and the international community, as 
violence in one state can destabilize the surrounding region. Successful power-sharing is 
theorized to prevent the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to the table. It 
would seem that evidence of this can be found in Burundi, where in 2009 the last rebel group, 
the National Liberation Forces, laid down their arms and were recognized as a legal political 
party (Freedom House 2010: Burundi). However, power-sharing is not without its critics. The 
formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may only serve to institutionalize differences 
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and exacerbate existing tensions. Granting groups considerable levels of autonomy may weaken 
the state, as it can potentially lead to secession as it seems to have recently in Southern Sudan.   
The fundamental question that animates this research is, therefore, a classic one. As 
Pippa Norris puts it in her volume of the same name: What drives democracy? More 
specifically, for this research, what makes democracy work in places where it probably should 
not? Can power-sharing arrangements produce the desired consequences of more democracy 
and stability in a region that has known little of either? Where democracy and stability succeed 
without power-sharing, what other factors account for this success? This study will argue that 
institutional arrangements that encourage power-sharing matter. By comparing the institutional 
levels of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan states to their measured levels of democracy and 
stability, the evidence will show that, in the aggregate, power-sharing is associated with more 
democratic and peaceful outcomes, at least when looked at in a single snapshot in time. 
However institutions do not operate in a vacuum. Contextual factors shape the degree to which 
power-sharing can work to alleviate conflict and give major actors buy-in to the democratic 
system. The neighboring states of Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire have similar levels of power-sharing 
but have experienced very different outcomes. Why has Ghana achieved a relatively high level 
of stability and freedom while Cote D’Ivoire has descended into civil conflict? In order to 
answer those questions we must return to the ‘usual suspects’ identified in the literatures on 
democratization and state-building in Africa.   
 
What Drives Democratic Consolidation?  
As mentioned earlier, some of the earliest theorizing about democracy sought to identify 
the unique circumstances that led to the emergence and consolidation of democracy in Europe 
and North America (Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Dahl 1971). These studies, not surprisingly, 
concluded that democracy would flourish in places that have economic prosperity, a diversified 
social structure with a dominant middle class, and a national culture that, by tolerating 
diversity, lends itself well to democracy.   While these early scholars identified factors that are 
certainly important for democratic consolidation, the primary focus was on socio-economic 
conditions, as Lipset’s study connecting democracy to wealth shows (Lipset 1959). More recent 
scholars of democratic state-building, particularly in developing countries, have expanded the 
list of conditions or requisites for democracy, adding in a focus on leader behavior, internal 
pressure for reform, and distribution of resources. 
 Many successful transitions to democracy have been credited to leaders within the 
ruling elite or the opposition that were committed to the successful implementation of a 
democratic system (Linz & Stepan 1978). Failed transitions have been equally associated with 
the failure of leaders and elites to share power, either due to their inability to adapt to a 
changing political climate or the abuse of power while in office. Equally important is how 
leaders cope with ethnic divisions, which represent a major source of conflict in many societies 
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(Kaufman 2001). The destructive potential of ethnic conflict has shown itself in the Bosnian War 
and in the Rwandan Genocide. These ethnic divisions may have long histories, such as those 
between Serbs and Muslims or be artificial creations of colonizers, as in the case of the Hutus 
and Tutsis. What both of these cases demonstrate is that, aside from the devastating casualties 
such conflicts can produce, they can also lead to complete breakdown of the state and its 
institutions. It is often assumed that heavily divided societies will face increased difficulties 
when it comes to accommodating interests, holding elections, and maintaining stability. As Jack 
Snyder (2000) points out, elections held in ethnically divided societies provide populist leaders 
with the opportunity to take advantage of ethnic identities to gain support. The use of such 
tactics can lead to further fractionalization between different religious, linguistic, or nationalistic 
groups and pose a threat to democracy, stability, and state. 
 Affluence certainly does not hurt the prospects of democracy in a country, but it is not 
sufficient to guarantee democracy. Further, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that as 
important as economic prosperity may be for democracy, the way in which this prosperity is 
distributed can also be equally important. The politics of economic inequality can generate 
radical movements and demands for political change. When faced with such opposition, 
regimes have several paths they can take. First, they can concede a degree of power by 
extending voting rights to the lower classes or use policies of redistribution to relieve social 
tensions. In the last path, elites may choose to actively suppress any oppositional movements or 
rebellions. When the ruling party does make concessions and is willing to transfer power to the 
opposition, democracy and stability are more likely. 
 Leadership choices may also interact with the type and distribution of natural resources 
in a state. The “resource curse,” as it is commonly known is a multi-faceted problem for many 
developing countries (Robinson et al, 2006). Often individual leaders inefficiently extract and 
distribute resources during temporary or permanent resource booms. When the boom is 
temporary they tend to extract as much as quickly as possible to consolidate as much wealth in 
their hands before the boom ends. However, when the resource boom is permanent, elites tend 
to use the increased income to stay in power by developing a system of patronage. In both 
cases, the increased wealth from abundant natural resources are used as a means of staying 
power, as opposed to being used for the economic development, consolidation of the state, and 
long term distribution of benefits across society.  
The failures of leaders and elite myopia can have grave consequences in one state, but as 
can be seen in the current Middle East and North Africa, what happens in one state can spill 
over into and destabilize neighboring states. Regional diffusion, as shown by Harvey Starr and 
Christina Lindborg (2003), has a great deal of influence on states in transition and in the process 
of democratizing. They find that states with neighbors transitioning from authoritarianism to 
democracy were more likely to make a successful transition themselves. The opposite also held 
true; states transitioning away from democracy had a negative impact on their neighbors, 
making them more likely to succumb to authoritarianism. Data also showed that the greater 
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number of bordering states that are free increases the likelihood that a given state will transition 
to democracy. Civil war or ethnic conflict in neighboring states, on the other hand, negatively 
impacts democratic consolidation and state stability. 
 If there are certain contextual preconditions for democratic transitions and 
consolidation, in Africa, we can additionally identify at least four categories of obstacles, similar 
to those first set forth by Richard Joseph (1999): lack of connection between people and the 
emerging political system, the effects of economic liberalization, group conflict as a challenge to 
state power, and the promises and pitfalls of electoralism. 
The state-building literature on Africa makes a strong case for establishing the 
normative foundations for democracy before the reintroduction of elections and multiparty 
politics. As John Harbeson (1999) shows, the diverse social and economic groups of South 
Africa formed foundational pacts that propelled the transition to a post-apartheid system. The 
success of this transition stands in sharp contrast to the contested legitimacy of popularly 
elected government in many sub-Saharan states. Deborah Brautigam (1999) analyzes the 
“Mauritius miracle,” and shows similarly how accomodationist practices allowed a variety of 
social classes to feel included in the economic prosperity of the country, despite deep party 
competition and the electoral defeat of incumbent governments. Accomodationist practices, 
however, can have their drawbacks as Linda Beck (1999) shows with Senegal’s enlarged 
presidential majority (EPM). EPM has allowed the Socialist Party of President Abdou Diouf to 
suppress opposition by including opposition leaders in his cabinet. This can be viewed as an 
example of the widespread practice of co-opting opposition politicians by giving them a share 
in state resources. The Socialist Party has retained control over all main instruments of state 
power, manipulated elections, while simultaneously broadening the composition of the 
government. Without genuinely civil institutions, democracy will be difficult to establish and 
consolidate. 
The same may be true of a civil economy. Thandika Mkandwire (1999) argues that a 
fundamental contradiction exists between democracy and the neo-liberal reforms that are often 
imposed on developing states through structural adjustment programs. These reforms may 
implicitly promote authoritarian regimes, so long as the bureaucracy implements the correct 
policies. Mkandwire argues this eventually means accounting to external agencies is more 
important than accounting to domestic institutions. Related to this, Crawford Young (1999) 
argues because contemporary Africa is tributary to the international system, reforms merely for 
the sake of international approval run the risk of trivializing democracy. Not all agree with this 
account. Robert Bates (1999) argues that externally imposed reforms encourage the breaking up 
of patronage networks and withdrawal from single-party rule. Both Bates and Mkandwire 
agree that democratic consolidation is difficult at best if African regimes are not accountable to 
the people and domestic economic forces.  
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The power of the state and conflicts between groups also challenges democratic 
consolidation in Africa, the primary challenge being how to accommodate different groups and 
their interests. As Jeffrey Herbst (1999) demonstrates, an increase in multi-party elections has 
led to increasing manipulation of citizenship requirements in places like Zambia, where 
incumbent regimes seek to block the candidacy of a member of the opposition and in doing so 
denationalize an entire group of society. Herbst argues that citizenship is fundamental to both 
the legitimacy of the state and democracy. Manipulation of citizenship requirements can be 
destabilizing for society and produce uncertainty in minority groups. The transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, which would typically be the point of inclusion and compromise, 
has been made dangerous by the plural nature of Africa states. Regime transition elevates the 
importance of ethnicity and provokes defensive postures by dominant groups. The return to 
multi-party elections encourage these groups to use ethnicity or identity as a foundation for 
their platform and hinders the ability of the transition government represent all groups. Issues 
between groups, as Herbst suggests, should be addressed before the resumption of multi-party 
elections. Don Rothchild (1999) presents similar findings to Herbst, and recommends the use of 
creative statecraft to overcome an absence in trust between groups. This leads to the conclusion 
that democratization is a two step process involving the formation of a modus vivendi between 
groups prior to elections, and then institutions can be established to provide formal 
mechanisms to foster group amity.  
In Africa, elections have often been useful tools for putting an end to armed conflict, but 
holding elections is not the same as establishing democracy. As Michael Bratton and Dan 
Posner (1999) show in their analysis of elections in Zambia and Ghana, electoralism can have 
mixed results. After defeating the ruling regime in multi-party elections the Zambian 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy used repressive tactics against its critics and the media, 
which slowed Zambia’s progress towards a true pluralist democracy. Gyimah-Boadi (1999) 
identifies several factors that contribute to the ‘electoralism fallacy’ in Africa. These factors 
include the disproportionate levels of resources available to the state, compared to the 
opposition, the presence of non-constitutional governance, such as the military, and overlap 
between the power of the state and the power of the ruling party. Whether elections become the 
first step in a genuine democratization process depends heavily on the amount of risk the ruling 
regime is willing to accept, and this brings us right back to the seemingly capricious whims and 
decisions of political elites.  
The Institutionalist Response 
 One problem with approaches that focus exclusively on contextual factors or pre-
conditions for democratic consolidation is that they ultimately seem to suggest that democracy 
is not something everyone is capable of achieving; only places that provide hospitable 
conditions. Di Palma dubbed this the “hothouse approach” (Di Palma 1990). Lipset conceded 
that democracy would remain largely absent in Africa due to high levels of poverty, low levels 
of education, and an elongated pyramid class structure. Many of these conditions are as true 
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today as they were in Lipset’s time, and as the above review indicated, we might add to this 
leaders who exacerbate societal divisions for political gain, use the state coffers to enrich their 
loyalists, or simply use elections as a means to take control of the executive with no plans to 
ever hand power to anyone else. Is Africa therefore destined to remain subject to the forces of 
economic liberalization, conflicts between the state and competing groups, and failed elections?  
 Neo-institutional scholars in recent years have responded to this approach with an 
extensive literature on democratic crafting, arguing essentially that stable democracy can be 
constructed even in places with the most unfavorable circumstances, if the right mix of 
institutions are chosen. There is within the literature an enthusiastic debate over what 
constitutes the right set of institutions in deeply divided societies: presidentialism or 
parliamentarism, a federal or unitary territorial distribution of power, majoritarian or 
proportional electoral rules? For these scholars institutions are not secondary to contextual 
factors; rather, institutions can be used to solve issues like ethnic conflict or consolidate 
democracy through repeated transfers in power. Arend Lipjhart, Pippa Norris, and others 
promote institutions of power-sharing, or institutions giving multiple groups access to political 
power. They argue that the distribution of political power through these institutions is what 
creates legitimacy, leads to better policy, and consolidates democracy.  
The Case For (and Against) Power-Sharing 
Power-sharing regimes are characterized by formal institutional rules that give multiple 
political elites a stake in the decision making process (Norris 2008:22). Constitutions that are 
conducive to power-sharing share common characteristics that include the following: executive 
power-sharing among a grand coalition of political leaders drawn from all significant groups, 
proportional representation of major groups in elected and appointed offices, and cultural 
autonomy for groups.  
Proponents of power-sharing argue that in post-conflict or ethnically cleaved states the 
only viable types of settlement capable of attracting agreement from all factions are power-
sharing regimes that avoid winner-take-all electoral outcomes. The more inclusive these power-
sharing arrangements are the more likely they will develop stronger support from stakeholders 
and therefore ensure stability.  While other methods of resolving conflict in ethnically divided 
societies have been attempted in the past, such as partition, these are often costly and end in 
failure (Street 2004). Institutions that allow for the horizontal and vertical dispersal of power are 
most relevant to heterogeneous societies that have a history of conflict and are in the process of 
democratizing. In Africa there is a tendency for elites to concentrate power at the center and use 
repressive means as a way of asserting control (Bratton & Rothchild 2004). Avoiding such 
circumstances is necessary if there is to be any substantial consolidation of democracy.  The use 
of power-sharing in these segmented societies guarantees all significant stakeholders a place in  
the national or regional governments and this provides a strong incentive for politicians to 
accept the legitimacy of the rules of game, moderate their views, and collaborate with rivals. 
Norris suggests that power-sharing institutions also encourage support for democracy by 
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avoiding winner-take-all elections and guaranteeing minorities that they will have a voice in the 
government. With assurances that they will not be excluded from government, minorities will 
also be less likely to take actions that might undermine the stability of the state.   
 While power-sharing institutions are often cited as being the best option for highly 
divided societies there are those who challenge these claims. Power-sharing regimes may in fact 
serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages and deepen rather than alleviate them. Explicitly 
recognizing the rights of ethnic groups can make it more difficult to generate cross-cutting 
cooperation in society by reducing electoral incentive for compromise. Power-sharing regimes 
that are based on formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may magnify the political 
importance of these identities. Solutions to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic factions as 
fixed and grant each group rights and autonomy may in fact reinforce sub-national identities, as 
seems to have been the case in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, where major ethnic groups are 
separated by the highly devolved entity structure and civil society formation has been almost 
exclusively along ethnic group lines. By de-emphasizing such identities, it might be possible to 
turn citizens towards a concept of society that is more inclusive and tolerant of other groups 
(Norris 2008: 28). Spears (2002) make the even stronger claim that that power-sharing 
institutions lead to an unstable form of government that at best provides a short reprieve from 
violent conflict but does not ensure democratic consolidation. Power-sharing arrangements are 
difficult to achieve and even more difficult to put into practice and do not stand the test of time 
or resolve conflict. They must actually bridge the cleavages of groups in conflict (Ibid). Power-
sharing cannot be about forming a grand coalition of friends, but must reconcile groups that are 
enemies. Including warring parties and excluding moderates can have negative consequences 
for divided societies using power-sharing (Jarstad 2006). Spears suggests that it is as difficult to 
forge an alliance with a member of the opposition as it is to form an alliance with someone who 
is considered a murderer. For many of these ethnically divided or post-conflict societies power-
sharing can be equated to making a deal with the devil and is therefore unlikely to be viewed as 
legitimate or workable from a policy perspective. The rejoinder of power-sharing advocates 
tends to be that these divisions already exist and have been a source of conflict. Choosing 
institutions that ignore group differences or force politicians to forge cross-group alliances 
might ignore important differences, possibly with perilous consequences for democratic 
representation and legitimacy.   
Institutional Choices 
 States, when using institutions as means of sharing power, have three areas to 
consider: The electoral system design, executive, and degree of decentralization. Electoral 
system design is a crucial variable in democratic stability because it provides the means by 
which political parties or minorities are either included in or excluded from government. 
Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems exemplify power-sharing.  In a study of 
several Sub-Saharan states, Reynolds finds that those states using proportional representation 
were more successful and stable democracies (Reynolds 2009). Lijphart (2004) notes that the 
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electoral system is crucial because it is significantly related to the development of the party 
system, type of executive, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive. PR is 
likely to be associated with a multi-party state, coalitions, and a more equal legislative-executive 
relationship. These characteristics define the consensus model of democracy that relies on 
separation, instead of concentration of power (Lijphart 2006; 1999; Norris 2004). The former two 
characteristics are significant for the representation of a diverse number of groups in divided 
societies, while the later prevents an executive take over. Like Reynolds, Norris also finds that 
states making use of PR are more successful at democratic consolidation, as opposed to those 
using majority or plurality electoral rules (Norris 2008: 130). 
The concept of a parliamentary executive, or using the legislature as a source for the 
executive, like PR, lends itself well to power-sharing and is advantageous for a number of 
reasons. The prime minister and cabinet can only continue to hold power so long as they have 
the support of the majority of the legislature.  There is therefore a stronger incentive for the 
executive and legislature to collaborate, which also increases inter-electoral flexibility and acts 
as a safeguard against unpopular prime ministers (Norris 2008: 141). Prime ministers also tend 
to lead more collegial cabinets, as opposed to the hierarchical cabinets found in presidential 
systems. This creates more collective accountability, as the ministers must present a united 
agenda. Overall parliamentary executives offer more forms of accountability and come closest 
to exemplifying power-sharing. 
The choice of electoral system and executive type influences the horizontal checks and 
balances of power in the central institutions of the state. On the other hand, decentralization 
determines vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of the government. Political, fiscal, 
and administrative decentralization are constitutional solutions to help mitigate conflict, 
consolidate peace, and protect minority communities (Norris 2008: 157). Decentralized 
governance has several advantages. First, it generates more democratic participation, 
representation, and accountability through regionally elected bodies. Next, fiscal 
decentralization reduces corruption by increasing the transparency and accountability of 
elected officials. Another advantage is the strengthening of public policy by allowing local 
governments to create and implement region specific policies. This is an important point for 
Sub-Saharan states, as the large size and diversity of the groups and regions within these states 
likely leads to issues pertinent to only a particular constituency. It is worth noting that with 
regards to plural societies, common in Sub-Sahara Africa and defined as states that contain 
multiple groups identified by ethnicity, religion, language, and a multitude of other 
characteristics, federalism and decentralization are considered important strategies for 
protecting the interests of spatially concentrated groups, especially if the administrative 
boundaries reflect the distribution of these groups. As Norris (2008) and Lijphart (2004) 
indicate, if the boundaries of sub-national governments are based on real social boundaries, the 
plural communities within these boundaries can become homogeneous within their region and 
thereby reduce communal violence and accommodate a multitude of interests within a single 
state.  
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These aforementioned institutional choices are not without their critics. The wisdom of 
using power-sharing institutions has been questioned and there exists a litany of drawbacks 
that must be addressed. First, proportional representation has a number of shortcomings often 
cited by its critics. The low voting thresholds that are characteristic in many proportional 
representation electoral systems give minority group representatives little incentive to appeal 
outside their own ethnic group, while moderate political leaders may be branded as traitors for 
attempting to appeal to a wider base. Proportional representation also may serve to 
institutionalize and reinforce ethnic tensions in society by failing to provide political leaders 
with incentives for cross-group cooperation. As Lardeyret (1991) argues, PR systems are 
inherently more unstable, since coalition governments cannot cope with serious disagreements. 
Lardeyret’s most important criticism is that PR is in fact the worst system to adopt for ethnically 
divided states in Africa (Ibid). Elections often degenerate into a competition between ethnic 
groups over public office and the best way to counteract this is to encourage members of each 
group to run against one another on trans-ethnic issues in single member districts (SMD). As 
Barkan suggests, in agrarian societies - common in Sub-Saharan Africa - PR often does not 
produce electoral results that are much more inclusive than majoritarian systems with single 
member districts (Barkan 1995). In addition, majoritarian systems make elected members 
directly responsible to constituency concerns and provide each district with a representative at 
the national level (Norris 2004). Conversely, PR tends to weaken the links between voter and 
representative as each region has no definitive representative. This in turn reduces the 
prospects for long-term democratic consolidation (Barkan 1998).   
Parliamentary systems, like PR, have also been criticized. Shugart and Carey (1992) 
argue that parliamentary executives lack accountability, identifiability, a system of mutual 
checks, and an arbiter. Under such a system there is no clear link between voters and the 
executive. A prime minister and his cabinet can be simply removed due to shifting coalitions or 
unpopularity in the legislature. Parliamentary systems also make it difficult for voters to 
identify specifically who they are voting for. When this type of executive is combined with PR, a 
party list may be the only way voters can influence the executive. The lack of separation 
between the executive and legislature means there are fewer checks and balances between the 
two and because of the prime minister’s presence in the legislature; it is difficult for them to act 
as an arbiter to secure legislative agreement.  
While the case for decentralization is also strong, critics often charge that decentralized 
governance leads to overly complex forms of government and slow response times because of 
the multiple points where responses can be stalled. By adding another layer of government 
bureaucracy, decentralization may actually increase costs, decrease efficiency, and result in poor 
services (Prudhomme 1995). The claim that decentralization increases representation and 
accountability has also met criticism. With numerous levels of government, it may be unclear as 
to who to appeal to, since the responsibilities of representatives at different levels may overlap. 
Decentralized governance also increases the possibility of clientelistic relationships forming 
between politicians and private citizens. Under such circumstances corruption may actually 
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expand, not contract. The benefits that decentralization is supposed to bring to plural societies 
have also been seriously questioned. There are critics that argue that when multiethnic 
communities are intermingled, territorial autonomy is ineffective at managing conflict (Norris 
2008: 164). The creation of sub-national structures may also lead to a breaking up of the state, 
while increased demands for autonomy may lead to conflict and even secession. In 
decentralized states where boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines it may lead to the rise in 
ethnically based parties or encourage politicians to use the ‘ethnic card’ as a means of attracting 
votes, thereby reinforcing ethnic identities, generating competition and conflict among groups, 
and destabilizing democratic institutions (Mozaffar & Scarritt 1999).  
The rejoinder of power-sharing advocates tends to be that the divisions power-sharing 
institutions supposedly exacerbate, already existed and were a source of conflict. Choosing 
institutions that ignore group differences or force politicians to forge cross-group alliances 
might ignore important differences, possibly with perilous consequences for democratic 
representation and legitimacy. Majoritarian electoral systems often fail to produce stability and 
majority rule often spells majority dictatorship in ethnically divided societies, while the 
electoral vagaries of more majoritarian electoral systems, such as the exclusion of substantially 
supported third parties, could prove catastrophic for fledgling democracies (Binningsbo 2006; 
Norris 2008: 25; Reynolds 1995; 1999). The concentration of power common in presidential 
executives and centralized states is also disconcerting. Presidential elections are often seen as 
winner-take-all elections, which reduces the likelihood the loser will accept the outcome, and 
the combination of the roles of both the head of state and government reduces the checks and 
balances on the executive (Lijphart 2008). At the same time centralized governance often results 
in the exclusion or underrepresentation of minorities, which can be dangerous as they may seek 
alternate routes to power. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
To Share or not to Share?: An Initial Test  
 If proponents of power-sharing are correct, it ought to be possible to find support for the 
following two hypotheses:  
H1: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater levels of democracy 
H2: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater state stability 
If critics of power-sharing are correct, and consensus institutions may actually 
exacerbate group conflict and destabilize or lead to capture of state institutions, then we should 
either find that the presence of power-sharing is unrelated to democratic outcomes or that it is 
inversely correlated, in other words, actually harmful for democratic consolidation.   
In order to test this, the present study will employ a most similar case design, 
controlling for similarities on the independent variable side in order to focus in on the 
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differences among cases (chiefly levels of power-sharing) that might explain different outcomes. 
Sub-Saharan African is a region where attempts at democratic rule have resulted in highly 
variable success, from fully free democracies to consolidated autocracies. The states within this 
region have also implemented a variety of institutions, some with greater degrees of power-
sharing than others. Since the study is examining only Sub-Saharan Africa there are a number of 
variables that can be controlled for. These factors include low levels of development, recent 
transitions to democracy, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and former colonization. All 48 states 
that comprise this region, according to the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, will be 
included in the study. This represents the universe of cases, but measures of democracy and 
stability and key institutional arrangements will only be measured for 2010. While studying the 
changes in democracy and stability over a period of time would be insightful, I chose not to 
because of the relatively fluid and dynamic nature of political institutions in Africa. 
Determining a time frame in which a majority of the Sub-Saharan states’ political institutions 
remained stable would be close to impossible. Bivariate correlations will show the degree and 
direction of the relationship between three variables: Power-Sharing Index Score, Freedom 
House Score, and Failed States Index Score. The four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa – 
Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern will also be included to determine whether there are 
any regional diffusion effects as posited in the literature.i  
Independent Variable 
 The independent variable institutional power-sharing is measured by examining the extent 
to which the formal institutions of a country allow for the inclusion of all major political actors 
in the decision making process. The three major institutions related to power-sharing will be 
examined: The electoral system, type of executive and state decentralization. Decentralization in 
this study refers to political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. These three institutions 
are the most critical to power-sharing and ensuring the consolidation of democracy.  
Those states that use PR, a parliamentary executive, and federalism are considered to 
have higher levels of power-sharing. States that utilize a majoritarian electoral system, 
presidential executive, and are highly centralized constitute systems, that according to the 
literature, allow for very little power-sharing. To actually quantify levels of power-sharing I 
have developed a 10 point index ranging from 0-9, that rates countries levels of power-sharing 
based on the aforementioned factors of electoral system type, executive type, and degree of 
decentralization. All three factors will be based on a 4-point scale, from 0-3, with higher scores 
indicating more power-sharing.  
For the electoral system the scale goes as follows: Proportional representation = 3pts; 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) = 2pts; SMD or Plurality = 1 pt; appointed legislature or 
non-existence of the national legislature = 0pts. For the electoral system variable, only the type 
of electoral system used for the lower house is considered in this index. The use of PR is 
associated with higher levels of power-sharing due to the low barriers it presents to parties 
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trying to gain representation in the legislature. Such low barriers allow a multitude of parties to 
attain seats in the national legislature. MMP is a compromise in that it is neither PR nor 
majoritarian, but represents a middle ground between the two. While not as inclusive as PR, it 
is a step above majoritarian systems in terms of power-sharing. The problem with MMP is that 
often the threshold for the PR part of the system is as high as 5% or more. This means that 
groups dispersed throughout the country may not be able to attain representation. Majoritarian 
systems using SMD are seen as the least conducive to power-sharing as it is often much more 
difficult for minor parties to gain representation. A result of this is often a reduction in the 
number of parties, the United States and United Kingdom being commonly cited examples of 
such systems, which often leads to a two party state and one party system. There are cases in 
which the national legislature is either wholly appointed or non-existent. As this runs contrary 
to the purpose of power-sharing, which is to promote democracy, such institutions are regarded 
as allowing no degree of power-sharing.  
The next institution considered is the executive branch, coded as follows: Parliamentary 
system= 3pts; Semi-Presidential= 2pts; Presidential= 1pt; appointed executive or monarchy 
=0pts. A parliamentary executive is associated with higher levels of power-sharing because the 
executive is often drawn from a coalition of parties that make up the majority in the lower 
house. Parliamentary systems also allow for the changing of the executive in a much more 
stable manner without the need for another national election. Systems that divide executive 
power, typically between a president and prime minister, are referred to as semi-presidential. 
While such systems do allow for the election of a prime minister and president these two 
officials typically come from the same party. Semi-presidentialism can also be dangerous if the 
prime minister and president are from different political parties as this can result in executive 
deadlock and competition for power. Established democracies like France might be able to 
survive these situations, but in less stable states this could be a catalyst for conflict. Presidential 
systems invest all executive power into a single person and in addition to being less 
representative, elections to this position can be seen as a zero-sum game in highly divided 
societies. This gives the losing parties less incentive to accept defeat, as recent elections in 
Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire have shown. The appointment of the executive, such as by an 
occupying force, or a monarchy like Swaziland represent an executive in which no power-
sharing can take place as the institution is utterly undemocratic. It should be noted that in this 
index those countries that have a president and prime minister are only considered semi-
presidential or parliamentary if the prime minister is chosen from the lower house or directly 
elected. If the president appoints the prime minister as part of his cabinet the system is 
considered presidential because the president is still effectively considered the head of state and 
head of government.  
The final factor, decentralization can be broken down into three categories and goes as 
follows: Federations = 3pts; Decentralized Unions = 2pts; Unitary States = 1pt (Norris 2008: 
173).  States with no central government or little to no control over territory =0pts. Federal 
institutions create another level of democratic representation in which minor or local parties can 
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gain representation. This additional level of government also grants a degree of autonomy to 
these locales and allows them manage local affairs. Decentralized hybrids, similar to Tanzania, 
have devolved powers down to local levels of government and represent a step in the right 
direction in terms of power-sharing. However in these systems nearly all important decision 
making and real power still rests with the central government, especially in fiscal matters. A 
majority of Sub-Saharan states represent a highly centralized unitary structure. Under such 
systems, little if any devolution of power has occurred and nearly all decisions come from the 
central authority. If a state is failed, such as in the example of Somalia, any form of devolution 
of powers is impossible. The state cannot even consider local or regional issues, let alone 
address them. With no place for representation from the local to national level, it is impossible 
for groups to share power. 
Not all states will fit perfectly within these definitions. Even two states that are 
presidential republics may have nuanced differences that set them apart. Levels of 
centralization and electoral systems can be especially complicated. States are often simply 
identified as federal or unitary (Lijphart 1999). For others though decentralization may be 
viewed as much more subtle process that involves incremental steps (Norris 2008: 170). The 
study of electoral systems usually involves identifying the rules of the system in place. For 
example it is often important to distinguish between open and closed list PR. The inability of 
the index to include such detail is a drawback. However, nearly all state institutions can be 
classified under one of the three sub-categories. The index considers the most relevant 
institutions and system types, which allows it to accurately rank states based on their levels of 
institutional power-sharing.  
Dependent Variable(s)  
 The first dependent variable is democracy. Democracy will be measured using the 
composite score of a country on the Freedom House Liberal Democracy Index. Freedom House 
uses the Gastil Index, a 7-point scale for measuring political rights and civil liberties. While 
other measures of democracy were considered, Freedom House was the only one with scores 
for the year 2010.  Changes in a states’ ranking are also explained along with any relevant 
political changes that took place. The index also does not favor any particular type of 
democratic institution. In other words, by default it does not consider a parliamentary executive 
any more democratic than a presidential executive.ii  
The second dependent variable is state stability. To measure this, the Failed States Index 
from ForeignPolicy.com and the Fund for Peace is utilized. The Failed State Index defines a 
state as failing when it loses physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force. The erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and 
inability interact with other states are also characteristics. The index includes 177 states and the 
Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology 
developed over the past decade.  The CAST model employs a four step trend-line analysis, (1) 
consisting of rating twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the 
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capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) 
identifying idiosyncratic variables or factors; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that 
shows the conflict history of the states being analyzed. The twelve indicators used are: 
Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven 
Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, 
Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention (Foreign Policy).iii 
Region 
Region was factored in due to the potential effects region may have on stability and 
democracy. As has happened before in Africa, a result of civil war is often human flight. A 
massive influx of refugees can place a great strain on the state that is the recipient of these 
people. The violence that drove these refugees might not only follow them, but their sudden 
presence in a foreign country has the possibility of inciting a xenophobic backlash among the 
native population. Another dangerous possibility is the chance rebel groups may use 
neighboring states as a launching point for attacks. Regional conflict has the potential to 
destabilize all surrounding states and maintaining stability is undoubtedly easier if neighboring 
states are not imploding due to civil war. Region is also important when considering democracy 
because of the idea of regional diffusion. In other words, democracy in one state has the 
potential to influence and spread to surrounding states. The ideas and institutions adopted by 
one state can impact those of another. If all states within a particular region had adopted 
democratic institutions, while those states outside of this region had failed to do so, one could 
conclude that regional factors played a role in the spread of democracy.   
Data Analysis and Results 
 If the data support the hypotheses that those states with higher levels of institutional 
power-sharing have higher levels of democracy and stability, then there should be a positive 
correlation between the Power-Sharing Index Score (PSI) and Freedom House Score (FH). There 
should also be a negative relationship between the PSI Score and Failed States Index Score (FSI). 
If the data do not support the hypotheses, the opposite will be seen in the results. A third 
outcome in this case is possible. The results may support none of the stated hypotheses and 
there simply might not be a significant relationship in either direction. This would truly be 
disappointing as it would imply that no set of institutions is likely to be any more effective in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 If region does have any significant affect on democracy and stability this should appear 
in the form of significant positive correlations between the individual regions and FH Scores 
and FSI Scores. The absence of such significant correlations means region can be ruled out as 
having any meaningful impact on a state’s measured level of democracy or stability. However 
the presence of any significant findings would indicate that there are regional factors that are 
influencing how stable and democratic a state is. The number of cases used in this study, 48, 
while relatively large for a comparative study, also means each individual case can have a 
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larger effect on the overall results. While this small number may justify the use of a 90 percent 
confidence level, statistical significance will only be given to results achieving a 95 percent 
confidence level.  
Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate correlation between the FSI Score, PSI Score, 
FH Score, and region.  In analyzing the findings, the first notable result can be seen in the 
strength and significance of the correlation between democracy and stability. While this 
association may seem obvious, it indicates that these two characteristics are not simply two 
random and unrelated concepts. Instead, it points to the fact that these are two characteristics of 
a state that are strongly associated with each other. Since power-sharing institutions are 
theorized to improve  these two aspects of a state, it is crucial they actually be related. The next 
significant result is the strong correlation between institutional power-sharing and democracy. 
This indicates that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing also have 
correspondingly higher levels of democracy. This supports the hypothesis that a higher level of 
institutional power-sharing is associated with more democracy. The correlation between power-
sharing and stability also turns out to be significant at the 95 percent level of confidence and 
moderately strong. The negative correlation is expected here as it shows that higher levels of 
power-sharing correlate negatively with instability. This supports the second hypothesis that 
higher levels of institutional power-sharing will be associated with more stability. As we see 
with these results, region has no significant relationship with either of the dependent variables. 
Thus, surprisingly given the emphasis on diffusion in some of the literature, the findings 
exclude region as being strongly associated with stability or democratization. 
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Table 1: Correlation between power-sharing (PSI), stability (FSI), democracy (FH) and Region 
Dependent Variables: FSI Score and FH Score 
 FH 
Score 
FSI 
Score 
PSI 
Score 
Eastern Western Central 
FH Score 
 
 
      
FSI Score 
 
 
.703** 
(.000) 
     
PSI Score .455** 
(.001) 
 
-.318* 
(.028) 
 
    
Eastern 
 
 
-.114 
(.438) 
 
.028 
(.852) 
-.233 
(.111) 
   
Western 
 
 
.167 
(.257) 
 
-.011 
(.939) 
 
.117 
(.427) 
.574** 
(.000) 
  
Central 
 
 
-.255 
(.080) 
 
.181 
(.218) 
-.090 
(.545) 
.316* 
(.029) 
.331* 
(.021) 
 
Southern .196 
(.182) 
 
-.213 
(.147) 
.247 
(.091) 
 
.292* 
(.044) 
.306* 
(.034) 
.185 
(.209) 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
                                      **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
The other significant findings reveal that the regions correlate with each other, in all but 
one instance, because they all share the similar characteristics of high instability and lower 
levels of democracy. The one instance in which the regions do not correlate with each other is in 
the case of Central and Southern Africa. This is most likely because Southern Africa is arguably 
the most stable and democratic region of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Central Africa is the worst 
in these regards.  
These findings lend strong support to power-sharing advocates, but they also reveal that 
power-sharing is neither necessary nor sufficient for democratic consolidation or state stability. 
It is not necessary, because some cases, like Ghana, democratize without especially high levels 
of power-sharing; not sufficient, because the presence of power-sharing institutions does not, by 
itself, guarantee democracy, peace, or stability. For this reason, the second part of this study 
utilizes a more in-depth approach to the cases of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Institutions, whether 
they are conducive to power-sharing or majoritarian in nature, are not exempt from the 
contextual influences present in a country. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are two cases that while 
similar in many respects have very different experiences with democracy.  The two cases below 
will demonstrate, with their relatively low levels of power-sharing, that the success or failure of 
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democracy in a country cannot only be attributed to the ‘right’ institutions. Both of these 
countries represent cases in which their success or failure can be attributed to factors identified 
in the literature and these cases confirm the existence of other factors, which must be 
considered, if we are to fully understand the relationship between the institutional and 
contextual requisites for democracy. 
Introduction to the Cases: 
Cote d’Ivoire 
In 1960 Cote d’Ivoire gained its independence from France and in the same year elected 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) president of the 
republic. An experienced politician of thirteen years in the French National Assembly, 
Houphouet-Boigny was first elected prime minister in 1959 before being elected president. 
Unlike many other post-colonial Sub-Saharan states, after independence Cote’ d’Ivoire 
experienced several decades of high economic growth and political stability. President Boigny’s 
rule was characterized as iron-fisted in which loyalty was rewarded. He banned all other 
political parties, established a one-party state, and won every subsequent presidential election, 
including the first multi-party elections in 1990, until his death in 1993.  
 Cote d’Ivoire under Houphouet-Boigny experienced extraordinary levels of economic 
growth by adopting liberal free market economic policies and attracting Western FDI to expand 
its cash-crop sector. By the early 80’s Cote d’Ivoire had one of the highest per capita incomes of 
any Sub-Saharan state without petroleum. Cote d’Ivoire during Houphouet-Boigny’s rule also 
adopted very liberal immigration policies. Many immigrants came from Burkina Faso and other 
surrounding West Africa states and were brought in to provide labor for the cash-crop sector. 
While Houphouet-Boigny was known to win over political opponents with compromise and 
cooperation, he also used an extensive system of patronage to maintain political power. In 
doing so he also wisely distributed this patronage among the different groups of Cote d’Ivoire 
to maintain widespread popularity. 
 When the prices of cocoa, coffee, and other cash crops bottomed out in the 80’s, this 
system of patronage came under threat. The government of Cote d’Ivoire had set up a price 
stability fund to ensure that if farmers did not get high enough prices at market for their 
products the government would pay the difference. As prices continued to drop this fund 
quickly dried up and subsidies to farmers had to be cut and Cote d’Ivoire external debt began to 
rise. Cote d’Ivoire applied for debt relief from the IMF in the early 80s and subsequently had a 
structural adjustment program put in place. As government revenues fell, funding was cut in 
many areas, particularly education. Civil unrest, lead by civil servants and students, forced the 
government to hold elections and adopt a multi-party system in 1990.  
At the time of elections in 1990, while there were a number of very small parties, the two 
major parties were the opposition, Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and the ruling PDCI. The FPI 
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draws its support mainly from Bete ethnic region of Laurent Gbagbo in the southwest. While 
present in all parts of the country, the PDCI draws much of its support from the regions of the 
Baoule ethnic group of central and east Cote d’Ivoire, home to both Presidents Houphouet-
Boigny and Bedie. The elections that took place were for both the 175-seat National Assembly 
and the President. Elections for the National Assembly took place in single-member districts 
using a first-past-the-post system and the President would be elected by popular vote and a 
simple majority. Under this new system the President would assume the role of head of state 
and command-in-chief and choose a Prime Minister whose main task was to oversee the cabinet 
or act as head of government. During this time, despite the SAP, economic conditions continued 
to decline. More than half of the population was involved in agriculture and this combined with 
falling cocoa prices and high population growth led to declines in living standards. Despite 
these challenges, Houphouet-Boigny won the first multi-party presidential elections, choosing 
Alassane Ouattara as his Prime Minister, with more than 80 percent of the vote. However, he 
died shortly after in 1993, which resulted in a power struggle as to who would succeed him.  
 The struggle over who would succeed Houphouet-Boigny was between Ouattara and 
Henri Konan Bedie, President of the National Assembly. Bedie ended up winning this power 
struggle, but in the process divided the PDCI. The result was the formation of the 
Rassemblement des Republicaines (RDR), who asked Ouattara to represent them in the 1995 
Presidential elections, and represented former disgruntled PDCI members who disagreed with 
Bedie. The RDR drew a majority of its support from the Muslim North, which also included 
large numbers of immigrants from neighboring states and groups that felt disenfranchised 
(Almas 2007). Meanwhile President Bedie inherited the economic woes of his predecessor. 
Prices for coffee and cocoa continued to fall, while corruption and mismanagement of funds led 
to reductions in foreign aid. During this time Bedie also began using the term Ivoirte, to denote 
those of ‘true’ Ivorian descent. This led to nationalistic and xenophobic politics, which under 
Houphouet-Boigny had remained largely suppressed, and would take Cote d’Ivoire down the 
road of civil war.  
Ghana 
       Just three years before Cote d’Ivoire, in 1957, the neighboring state of Ghana gained its 
independence from the United Kingdom. The Convention Peoples Party (CPP) and its leader 
Kwame Nkrumah sought to establish a modern socialist state that organized economic and 
political development and provided stability and increased productivity through labor, unions, 
cooperatives, and other organizations within the CPP. The state for Nkrumah was a tool 
through which the CPP could achieve these objectives.  
 In July of 1960 a new constitution was adopted, which changed Ghana from a 
parliamentary government with a prime minister, to a presidential republic. Shortly thereafter 
freedom of press was done away with when Nkrumah was given the power to preview 
publications before publication. This eventually led to a constitutional referendum which 
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changed Ghana into a one-party state. Ghana’s first of many coups occurred a few years later in 
1966 when the Ghanaian Army and police overthrew Nkrumah. The CPP and National 
Assembly were dissolved and the constitutions suspended. The reasons for this coup were 
supposedly due to Nkrumah’s abuse of civil liberties, corrupt and abusive practices, and a 
rapidly declining economy.  
 The new regime was known as the National Liberation Council (NLC) and promised a 
quick return to a civilian led government. Civil servants were left to handle the country and the 
judiciary remained in place. Known as the Second Republic, elections were held in 1969 and the 
Progress Party led by Kofi A. Busia won a majority in parliament. In 1970 presidential elections 
were held and former Chief Justice Edward Akufo-Addo was elected President, at which time 
Busia became Prime Minister. However even under a civilian led government, the economy 
continued to decline and inflation rose. By 1972 the military had once again seized power in a 
bloodless coup and formed the National Redemption Council (NRC). This new regime was 
headed by Col. I.K. Acheampong and promised improvements in quality of life. In 1975 the 
government was reorganized into the Supreme Military Council (SMC) and headed 
Acheampong.  The SMC was unable to deliver the improved conditions it promised and was 
increasingly plagued by corruption and poor management. Acheampong brought forward the 
concept of a united government in 1977, which would have made Ghana a non-party state. Seen 
as an attempt by Acheampong to hold on to power, protesters took to the streets to demonstrate 
against the government. In July of 1978 Acheampong was arrested and the SMC-2 was founded, 
headed by Lt. Gen. Frederick Akuffo.  
 Akuffo planned to return to a constitutional democracy and formed a Constitutional 
Assembly and allowed political parties to exist. However, Akuffo like his predecessors was 
unable to diliver on his promises and in 1979 was deposed in a violent coup by the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings. The AFRC 
executed several senior military officers, including former heads of state Acheampong and 
Akuffo. It also conducted a purge of the military and government, and tried private citizens in 
an attempt to rid the country of corruption. Most were tried without due process, had all 
private property confiscated, and sentences to prison terms.  
 The Constitutional Assembly formed under Acheampong remained intact and the AFRC 
accepted, for the most part, the draft constitution that was submitted. Scheduled elections took 
place in September of 1979 and power was handed over to the newly elected President and 
Parliament of the Third Republic. The new constitution was modeled on those of Western 
democracies and included separation of powers between the president and the Parliament. The 
new president was Dr. Hilla Limann, head of the People’s National Party (PNP), the successor 
to the CPP. Economic decline continued and corruption rose, resulting in Rawlings leading 
another coup in December of 1981. Rawlings suspended the constitutions and dissolved 
Parliament. The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) was formed, headed by 
Rawlings. In 1982 the PNDC announced plans to begin decentralizing power to the regions, 
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districts, and local communities. The PNDC maintained power by appointed members to 
regional and district council, but they were expected to eventually assume more and more 
power from the national government. In 1984 the National Commission on Democracy was 
formed to study ways in which democracy could be established in Ghana. In 1987 the 
commission issued a ‘Blue Book’ outlining modalities for district elections. Elections to district 
assemblies were held in 1988 and 1989.  
 The transition to the Fourth Republic of Ghana began when pressure for reform forced 
the PNDC to establish the Consultative Assembly (CA). The assembly drafted a new 
constitution, which the PNDC accepted. In May of 1992 the ban on party politics was lifted and 
multi-party politics resumed. Political power quickly formed around two major political parties. 
The PNDC reformed under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to run in the elections, 
with Rawlings as its candidate. Due to Rawlings popularity, the NDC enjoyed widespread 
support throughout the country and across ethnic groups. The main opposition, the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP), drew many of its supporters from Southern Ghana and the Akan group, 
which represents nearly half of Ghana’s population. Ghana’s economy during the time of 
democratization was not much better than Cote d’Ivoire’s, but was experiencing some positive 
gains. GDP had been steadily rising since the mid-80s, cocoa production was up, and inflation 
had been reduced, but remained high. However, similar to Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana’s economy 
remained unstable and external debt was on the rise, which consequently made it increasingly 
dependent on foreign aid to make payments. Regardless, presidential and parliamentary 
elections were held in late December of 1992. Parliamentary elections took place under a 
majoritarian electoral system with SMD, while the President was elected via a simple majority. 
The constitution became official in early January of 1993. Rawlings was elected President in the 
first elections of 1992 and the subsequent elections held in 1996, were considered free and fair 
by the international community.  
 
Why the Divergent Paths? 
 The question that immediately arises, even just after reading the brief political history of 
both countries since independence is, why the divergent paths? Why did Ghana, with a 
turbulent history of coups, under the leadership of a man who had twice overthrown the 
government and distrusted liberal multi-party democracy, transition successfully to 
democracy? While simultaneously Cote d’Ivoire, with a history of political stability and strong 
economic growth, failed to democratize and descended into civil war. The situation, especially 
in light of the literature considered above, would seem contradictory and counter-intuitive. 
However, when examined closely, the cases reveal that factors identified within the literature 
on Africa, played the most pivotal role in the divergent pathways of these two West African 
states.  
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 As can be seen from table 2 below, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana share a number of 
similarities. They both receive identical scores on the Power-sharing Index and have similar 
political institutions. The power-sharing scores of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are moderately low 
and this emphasizes the point that, while the first part of this study shows greater levels of 
power-sharing  do correlate with more democracy and stability, these institutions do not 
operate in a vacuum and thus contextual factors must  also be considered. Both cases are similar 
in size with comparable populations. Both countries are similar in their ethnic heterogeneity 
and north-south divide between a predominately Muslim North and Christian South. Their 
GDP, and GDP-per capita are also very similar. Important to note as well are their similar dates 
of independence and years of democratization.  
However, this is where the similarities end. Cote d’Ivoire is considered Not Free by 
Freedom House, and the Failed States Index ranks it as one of the most unstable countries in the 
world. Ghana on the other hand has a Freedom House ranking similar to many highly 
developed Western democracies and is one of the most stable countries on the continent of 
Africa. At first glance it would appear that many of Cote d’Ivoire’s indicators of development, 
such as life expectancy, level of poverty, high corruption, and its Human Development Index 
score might explain its current situation. It would certainly confirm the theories of the classical 
literature on the necessary socio-economic conditions for stable democracy. However upon 
reviewing the history of Cote d’Ivoire, many of these statistics, such as a lower life expectancy 
and higher levels of poverty, are a result of nearly a decade of civil strife and thus cannot 
account directly for its failed attempt at democracy. Cote d’Ivoire’s economy and people have 
suffered greatly from the persistent conflict, and the statistics below reflect that.  
There are several possible explanations as for the divergent outcomes. The institutions of 
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana are similar in many respects. Both states utilize a unicameral 
legislature, which elects its members using a majoritarian SMD system. The executive systems 
in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana are also similar in that they both have popularly elected Presidents. 
The key difference, in terms of their institutions, would be their levels of centralization. Cote 
d’Ivoire remained a highly centralized state, with power concentrated in the hands of the ruling 
PDCI.  Ghana, beginning under Rawlings in 1981, attempted to decentralize power. Ghana’s 
decentralization began when Rawlings created People’s Defense Committees (PDC) in each 
town and village. The current system of decentralization in Ghana came into place in 1988 when 
the PNDC created District Assemblies (DA) in 110 newly created districts. These were later 
incorporated into the new constitution and the 1993 Local Government Act (Crawford 2009). 
Cote d’Ivoire has experience almost nothing in the way of decentralization. Perhaps the closest 
thing Cote d’Ivoire has seen of decentralization was ‘divide and rule’ strategy of Houphouet-
Boigny’s patronage system, which distributed resources across the country as a means of 
securing loyalty.  
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Table 2. Socio-Economic & Political Indicators 
 Ghana Cote d’Ivoire 
Political Indicators 
 
Power-Sharing Index 
 
Freedom House  
 
Failed States Index 
 
Year of Independence 
 
Year of Democratization 
 
Institutions(Electoral/Executive/ 
Decentralization) 
 
Corruption (Transparency Intl.) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization (Alesina et al 
2003) 
 
Social & Economic Indicators 
 
Population 
 
Area 
 
Region 
 
GDP 
 
GDP per capita HDI 
 
Adult Literacy 
 
GINI 
 
HDI 
 
Life Expectancy 
 
Poverty 
 
Last Major Conflict 
 
 
Successfully Resolved? 
 
 
4 
 
1.5 
 
67.1 
 
1957 (UK) 
 
1992 
 
Maj/Pres/Decetralized  Union 
 
 
4.1 
 
0.67 
 
 
 
 
24,339,838 
 
238,533 sq km 
 
Western 
 
38.24 bil 
 
1,600 
 
57.9 
 
40.8 
 
0.467 
 
60.55 
 
28.5% (2007) 
 
1994-5 (northern/regional 
ethnic/tribal) 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
4 
 
5.5 
 
101.2 
 
1960 (France) 
 
1990/93 
 
Maj/Semi/Unitary 
 
 
2.2 
 
0.82 
 
 
 
 
21,058,798 
 
322,463 sq km 
 
Western 
 
37.8 bil 
 
1,800 
 
48.7 
 
44.6 
 
.397 
 
56.19 
 
42% (2006) 
 
2002-03 (Civil 
War) 
 
No 
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However, for a number of reasons it is unlikely that Ghana’s efforts at decentralization 
are a driving factor in its success. First off, the PDC’s created in the early 80s were made up of 
local PNDC activists who effectively took over local government responsibilities and limited 
their focus to the implementation of local self-help projects (Crawford 2003). The DA’s created 
carried over into The Fourth Republic, as well as the provision that gives the President the 
power to appoint one-third of the members in each DA and the District Chief Executive, who 
presides over the Executive Committee of the Assembly, the body that creates a majority of the 
policy in each District. Despite frequent rhetoric to further decentralization, legal, political, 
financial, and administrative constraints have thwarted any real progress, which indicates that 
the central government is reluctant to devolve any real powers or resources, maintaining central 
control through mechanisms within the system of decentralization (Crawford 2009). 
Decentralization efforts appear mainly concerned with handing off administrative duties, not 
the actual devolution of political authority.  
While it seems institutional differences between Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana cannot fully 
explain different outcomes, the rapid economic decline of Cote d’Ivoire in the early 90s has been 
offered as an explanation and would seems to confirm Lipset’s theory on the tie between 
democracy and wealth. However, economic decline prior to 1990 also cannot fully account for 
Cote d’Ivoire failure, either, as Ghana was also experiencing economic hardship, and other 
African nations, such as Zambia experienced rapid economic deterioration in the late 80s and 
early 90s and yet did not experience political breakdown (Almas 2007). This means that, while 
very similar in many respects, an analysis of mere statistical differences between the two 
countries cannot explain why Cote d’Ivoire has remained authoritarian and unstable, while 
Ghana has successfully democratized. The SAP’s implemented on both countries are also 
unlikely causes of success or failure. The SAP Ghana adopted was one of the most stringent on 
the continent and forced the Rawlings government to make drastic economic changes. Cote 
d’Ivoire implemented its SAP in the early 80s and thus such a program can be seen more as a 
driver of democratization, due to the internal pressures for change resulting from austerity 
policies, not a cause of democratic failure. Ultimately the way in which each of these countries, 
or any country, deals with economic hardship is the result of decisions made by the political 
elite. Both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire were struggling with economic hardship, however, as will 
be shown the elite of Cote d’Ivoire decided to react to these economic challenges in a much 
more destructive manner.  
It is certainly true that economic decline can have consequences, but when discussing 
Africa it is often difficult to get away from the potential effects of former colonization. This is 
especially relevant in Cote d’Ivoire’s case as France has maintained especially close economic 
and political ties with its former colony, something not seen in the case of Ghana and the United 
Kingdom. Under Houphouet-Boigny, close ties were developed with its former colonizer often 
in the form of exclusive rights to resources for French companies and maintenance of French 
marines on Ivorian soil. France’s involvement in Cote d’Ivoire was in fact so substantial that 
many questioned Cote d’Ivoire status as an independent state, considering it more of an oversee 
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dependency (Yere 2007). France’s continued involvement in Cote d’Ivoire came to a head in 
2004 when French forces clashed with forces loyal to President Gbagbo during a peacekeeping 
operation. Many within Cote d’Ivoire saw this as French imperialism and means by which 
France could destroy Cote d’Ivoire’s military capabilities and reassert its dominance over its 
former colony. French meddling in Cote d’Ivoire’s affairs was seen as the cause of civil war and 
democratic failure because it supposedly undermined Cote d’Ivoire nationhood. The military 
confrontation in 2004 represents to some a ‘second independence’ for Cote d’Ivoire and the 
reassertion of its nationhood and sovereignty (Ibid).  However this brings the question back 
around to identity in Cote d’Ivoire and the failure of Houphouet-Boigny to define the nation of 
Cote d’Ivoire. While it is certainly possible French involvement may have belittled Ivorian 
sovereignty, it did not prevent Houphouet-Boigny and his regime from defining the nation of 
Cote d’Ivoire or force his successors to develop a concept of Ivorian citizenship that 
marginalized vast portions of the population and resulted in a breakdown of democratic 
institutions and civil war. 
 
Democracy in Cote d’Ivoire & Ghana 
If the success of democracy in Ghana and its failure in Cote d’Ivoire cannot be primarily 
attributed institutions, economic forces, or former colonization, what are the causal factors that 
account for the different outcomes? 
Looking at Cote d’Ivoire first, the decision by Houphouet-Boigny to institute political 
pluralism was not by choice, but a response to crises. Houphouet-Boigny and his regime saw a 
transition to democracy as their only alternative if they wished to remain in power.  The 
economic decline Cote d’Ivoire was experiencing reached a climax in 1990 when economic 
growth went into the negative numbers. Exports fell while external debt continued to rise, along 
with unemployment. Allassne Ouattara, prime minister at the time, instituted a severe 
reduction in public spending, which consequently drove up the prices of commodities and 
food.  As mentioned, a Structural Adjustment Program had been implemented in the early 
1980’s to combat the failing economy, but the malaise caused by the SAP and economic decline 
culminated in widespread protests (Handley 2008). The protests were initiated first by students 
and professors, but eventually spread to the police and army, who demanded better pay and 
better working conditions. The protests sweeping the country were calling for alternatives to 
one party rule and opposition parties pushed for a transition to democracy. The multi-party 
politics that ensued, as opposed to empowering the masses, took a top-down approach. It is 
here that Cote d’Ivoire encounters its first obstacle to democracy mentioned in the literature: 
Failure to connect the people with the emerging political system. The decision making process 
was not democratized and the people were excluded and disempowered in the post-1990 
political system. By doing so the legitimacy of the newly established democratic institutions 
was fatally undermined. The focus for the ruling elites was merely to democratize and multi-
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party elections became the sole objective. As a result the democratization process was not 
complete and thus fundamental aspects of democracy, such as human rights, gender equality, 
freedom of speech, and the free press were not emphasized and no mechanism was created to 
protect these.  
The oppressive single party system Cote d’Ivoire had been under for 30 years also left its 
people and the opposition completely unprepared to deal with multi-party democracy. The 
opposition parties, rather than promoting democratic values and disbanding their militias, 
simply saw multi-party elections as the end goal of democracy (Edi 2008). The opposition was 
so focused on ending the regime of President Houphouet-Boigny that they completely forgot to 
lay the ideological foundations for multi-party democracy. Thus when democratization began 
and the first multi-party elections were held, the problems that were simmering under the 
surface began to show themselves.  The multi-party elections held in 1990 were the first since 
1960. The PDCI, with Houphouet-Boigny as its candidate was challenged mainly by the FPI, 
and their candidate, Laurent Gbagbo. The problem was that the elections took place only ten 
months after the legalization of multi-party politics. This was insufficient time to create a 
democratic system after three decades of single party and single person rule. The elections 
themselves were also rigged; with their organization left in the hands of the PCDI controlled 
Ministry of the Interior. The elections were not transparent and there were widespread reports 
of voter fraud. Access to state media was given almost exclusively to the PDCI, while the 
opposition had relatively little coverage of their campaigns. The PCDI’s hegemony over state 
resources and ministries prior to elections meant it was unlikely that elections would be fair or 
free.  It is in these premature elections that Cote d’Ivoire stumbles over another obstacle 
discussed in the literature: The pitfalls of electoralism. As indicated in the literature, issues 
between competing groups must be addressed and the normative foundations of democracy 
need to be laid before the resumption of multi-party elections, which Cote d’Ivoire failed to do. 
Both the ruling elites and opposition forces perceived democracy as simply consisting of multi-
party elections, sabotaging their democratic system. 
Compounding the ideological shorting-comings of Cote d’Ivoire’s political system was the 
process of democratization began without the drafting of a new constitution. The constitution in 
place during 1990 was unable to cope with the volatile political discourses of a democratic 
transition. While providing for political pluralism, the 1990 constitution did not address 
important questions such as the creation of an independent electoral commission, criteria of 
eligibility for presidency, rights of foreign nationals, or more importantly, nationality and 
citizenship issues. Cote d’Ivoire, with little political education on democracy and no 
constitutional foundation, had little chance from the start of successfully democratizing.  
It is in the initial phases of democratization that Ghana differs greatly from Cote 
d’Ivoire. While the Nkrumah government was overthrown shortly after independence and as 
mentioned, Ghana experienced several other coups before democratization, it still made several 
attempts to establish democratic civilian rule (Gyimah-Boadi 2007). It is obviously difficult to 
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determine how effective any of these civilian governments or previous constitutions may have 
been, as they typically only lasted a few years before being deposed or re-written. However, 
from these experiences the opposition in Ghana understood that multi-party elections alone 
were necessary but not sufficient to ensure effective governance or guarantee their political 
freedoms.  
It should be noted at this point that there is a key similarity between Ghana and Cote 
d’Ivoire’s processes of democratization. This being Ghana, in similar fashion to Cote d’Ivoire, 
held multi-party elections only six months after the legalization of political parties. There exists 
a difference though in the approach these two countries took towards national multi-party 
elections. Cote d’Ivoire’s political elite and opposition both failed to establish the ideological 
foundations necessary for democracy and the institutions required to protect it, in part through 
their failure to draft a new constitution and premature elections. Ghana, on the other hand, 
prior to elections drafted, and through a national referendum approved, a new constitution to 
found the Fourth Republic. 
The crafting of the Fourth Republic was a multi-staged process beginning with the 
National Commission for Democracy (NCD). This body, convened in 1990, set about the task of 
developing ideas for a new constitution. The report they published in 1991, knowing Rawling’s 
and the PNDC’s opposition to multi-party democracy, recommended Ghana return to multi-
party politics and an exclusion of the military from participating in national politics (Frempong 
2007). The PNDC accepted the NCD’s report and formed a nine-member Committee of Experts, 
which formed a report in the form of a draft constitution. At this point the Consultative 
Assembly (CA), a 260 member body, was formed to actually draft a new constitution, which 
was different in many regards from the proposal set forth by the Committee of Experts. After 
being approved through a national referendum in April of 1992, the Fourth Republic began on 
January 7th, 1993, following national elections.  
As stated, elections were held only six months after the legalization of political parties, 
but the actual process of democratizing took almost three years, not ten months in the case of 
Cote d’Ivoire, and distinguishes it from previous attempts at democracy. Additionally, the new 
constitution contained a wide-ranging Bill of Rights, Fundamental Human Rights, and 
protection of other political, social, and economic rights. It also contained articles on the rights 
of women, children, and the sick and disabled. To actually protect these rights the constitution 
required that Parliament establish, within six months, a number of constitutional commissions, 
such as the Electoral Commission, Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, 
and Media Commission, to ensure good governance, accountability, and political participation. 
Furthermore, to ensure their independence once established, these constitutional commissions 
were only accountable to the Constitution (Ibid). Important as well was the establishment of a 
consensus-building mechanism, the Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC), which provides a 
political forum for opposing parties and stakeholders to sort out differences and contribute to 
electoral reform (Ibid). The pro-democratic forces within Ghana understood that to actually 
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build a new democracy, a new constitution was also required. By establishing this new 
constitution Ghana hurdles the two obstacles, pitfalls of electoralism and link between the 
people and system, which Cote d’Ivoire failed to overcome. The new constitution addressed the 
grievances that resulted from military dictatorship and safeguarded the freedoms of the people. 
Ghana’s choice not to rush into multi-party elections, but systematically establish a democratic 
system where the constitution provides safeguards against tyranny and actually institutionalize 
the mechanisms necessary to protect the rights of the people, was crucial in ensuring the success 
of the Fourth Republic. As Rothchild concludes in the literature and Ghana demonstrates, 
successful democratization involved forming a modus vivendi between groups and then 
establishing the institutions and formal mechanism to foster group amity. 
Another factor the literature points towards is the way in which individual leaders 
handle political risk. The success of elections or institutions often depends heavily on the 
willingness of the ruling regime to accept the risks of multi-party democracy. Rawlings’ and the 
PNDC elite’s acceptance of the political risks of democracy was of absolute importance for the 
survival of democracy in Ghana. Rawlings had previously overthrown a democratically elected 
government and it was unclear, especially after opposition victory in 2000 if he might attempt 
another coup. Rawlings’ willingness to follow the rules of the games, especially during the 1996 
national elections, provided Ghana’s nascent democracy with a much needed sense of security 
and legitimacy. Rawlings disagreed with but respected the call for democracy, accepted the 
inherent risks of multi-party elections. It was likely Rawlings was willing to accept such risks 
because not only was he aware of his widespread popularity, thus making it likely he would 
win the upcoming elections, but he also ensured that included in the new constitution was an 
article providing political immunity for him and members of the ruling PDNC for past actions 
and human rights abuses (Handley 2008). Had Rawlings chosen not to accept such a threat to 
his power or oppose the victory of the opposition in the 2000 national elections, Ghana might be 
a very different place today. 
 This is an important difference between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and set them down 
very different paths. It is undeniable that Bedie was operating under very different 
circumstances than Rawlings. Bedie did not possess the widespread popularity of his 
predecessor or Rawlings, nor the means to buy his political security like Houphouet-Boigny. 
However it is likely that had he chosen to accept the political risks associated with multi-party 
elections, Cote d’Ivoire’s early experiences with democracy would have been different. Even 
without a new constitution, the support of democracy from the ruling party would have had a 
legitimizing effect for democracy in Cote d’Ivoire and possibly set it down a course similar to 
Ghana’s. 
Instead, in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, Bedie clearly perceived multi-party elections as a 
threat to his power. The support that Ouattara could muster may have proven enough to win 
the presidential elections and remove Bedie and the PDCI from office. This risk proved to be 
unacceptable. Political suppression and the implementation of Ivoirite were means by which 
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Bedie could mitigate the risk of being removed from power. It is at this point that Cote d’Ivoire 
lands the fatal blow to democracy and stability. It hits and fails to overcome the obstacle of 
group conflict and how to accommodate multiple interests.  
At roughly the same time Ghana was constructing a strong foundation for democracy, 
the political elite of Cote d’Ivoire were sowing the seeds of failure. The second phase of the 
failure of democracy in Cote d’Ivoire began when the malaise of the early 90’s, exacerbated by 
multi-party elections, brought the issue of Ivorian identity and citizenship to the foreground. 
Tensions rose between previously peaceful ethnic groups as the issue of citizenship became the 
most important topic in Ivorian politics. This topic polarized political debates and destroyed 
national cohesion as people began using foreigners and immigrants as scapegoats for the 
abysmal economic conditions and high unemployment. Rising out of all this conflict over 
national identity was the term Ivoirite. 
The concept of Ivoirite has its roots in the liberal immigration and citizenship policies 
under Houphouet-Boigny. While he managed to attract foreign investment and build a 
relatively successful economy he failed to institutionalize any transparent form of democratic 
governance or clearly define the criteria for Ivorian citizenship. His policies on immigration 
allowed immigrants to participate in politics and subsequently blurred the distinction between 
who is Ivorian and non-Ivorian. This proved fatal due to the multiple cleavages that divide the 
country. Cote d’Ivoire has over sixty ethnic groups which are further divided by the Muslim 
north and Christian south. This regional divide is further exacerbated by economic disparities 
between the more wealthy south and poorer north. Additionally, roughly a quarter of Cote 
d’Ivoire’s population is from neighboring northern countries, like Burkina Faso, who share 
cultural similarities.  
 Upon the death of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993, Henri Bedie succeeded him as President, 
but this came at the cost of a fractured PDCI and the creation of the RDR (Edi 2008). Ahead of 
the 1995 elections he attempted to consolidate power and gain support by restricting opposition 
parties and instigating the Ivoirite policy. The term Ivoirite arose from southern intellectuals who 
wanted to define what it was meant to be Ivorian. However it was introduced into politics as a 
nationalist-qua-ethnic political strategy to create a sense of nationalism and garner support (Bah 
2010). Additionally, Bedie, unlike his predecessor, could not rely on patronage politics. In the 
decades after independence, the economic growth of Cote d’Ivoire and distribution of resources 
allowed the political elite to maintain a grip on power. However, the economic recession, 
growing external debt, and pressures to democratize meant the political elite could no longer 
rely on older strategies to maintain power. State resources, which had been used to develop a 
strong patronage network, no longer existed and elites had to find new ways of consolidating 
power. The use of authoritarian tactics was one measure, but by far the most destructive tactic 
was the policy of Ivoirite.  
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The whole concept of Ivoirite rests on a distinction between indigenous Ivorians and 
Ivorians of immigrant ancestry. According to Bedie Ivoirite was supposed to sum up the cultural 
identity of Ivorians, such as their languages, music, food, etc. Naturalized Ivorians, still 
regarded as Ivorian citizens, were no long ‘true’ Ivorians according to this ideology (Yere 2007). 
The creation and promotion of this ideology coincided nicely with the upcoming Presidential 
elections. The new electoral law implemented in 1994, a year before the presidential elections in 
1995, stipulated that to be a presidential candidate, one had to be born of Ivorian parents who 
themselves were Ivorian born. It managed to be simultaneously anti-immigrant and anti-
northern. The true intention of this policy was to marginalize northerners, who formed the 
support base of the RDR. This equated them to immigrants from countries like Burkina Faso 
and implied that they at best could only be Ivorians of immigrant ancestry. The Ivoirite based 
electoral laws and citizenship identification politices also, coincidentally, disqualified many 
Ivorians from the north from participating in politics and stripped them of their citizenship 
rights. These policies were aimed almost specifically at one person, Alassane Ouattara, the 
leader of the opposition party RDR, who allegedly had a father from Burkina Faso and he was 
therefore excluded from running. Ouattara’s party nor the other main opposition party, the FPI, 
participated in the 1995 elections and it was from this point forward that the policy of Ivoirite 
was seen as a deliberate attempt by the government to exclude people from the North of Cote 
d’Ivoire from participating in political life. The effects of Ivoirite were not limited to only 
politics, but also affected other areas of Ivorian society such as national identification, land 
tenure, and public sector employment. Many people from the north were denied citizenship 
because they could not prove their parents were of Ivorian descent, due to lack of birth records. 
The result was many northerners and naturalized Ivorians felt marginalized and discriminated 
against by the state in all areas of life.  
The rule of President Bedie can be briefly characterized as oppressive and corrupt. 
During his tenure as President, aside from instigating Ivoirite, he repressed individual rights 
and the media. The opposition attempted to form a grand coalition to opposed Bedie and the 
PCDI, but failed spectacularly as none of their differences were sorted out before the alliance 
was formed. The identity and citizenship crisis started by Bedie eventually led to his downfall 
in 1999 when, in fear of a coup, he attempted to ‘ethnicize’ the army by appointing loyal officers 
at the heads of unit in the army. The response was a coup by General Guei. However this would 
not be the end of Ivoirite. 
 When Bedie was overthrown in 1999, the actions of General Guei only served to 
exacerbate the identity crisis. In an attempt to win the 2000 elections Guei suppressed the 
opposition and perpetuated the doctrine of Ivoirite by disqualifying Ouattara from running (Bah 
2010). The RDR boycotted the presidential election and Guei discarded the results of the 
election, declaring himself President. Massive protests forced General Guei to cede power and 
flee, but opened the door for Gbagbo, of the FPI, to ascend to the Presidency. The RDR and 
many northerners insisted he did not have an electoral mandate and dismissed his government 
as illegitimate from the start. Gbagbo also continued to support Ivoirite and insisted that since 
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Ouattara was not an indigenous Ivorian, he was not qualified to run as President. Gbagbo’s 
actions show he failed in the same areas of Bedie, by failing to re-incorporate the 
disenfranchised North; he excluded competing groups from power and created an illegitimate 
government. The political situation eventually disintegrated into civil war after a failed coup 
attempt in 2002. Rebels attacked Abidjan and quickly took control of the Northern half of the 
country. Inter-communal fighting also broke out as supporters of the rebels clashed with pro-
FPI/Gbagbo supporters.  
The policy of Ivoirite proved to be the final straw for Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic 
institutions.  The failure of Cote d’Ivoire’s ruling elite and opposition to establish the 
foundations for democracy and top-down approach forged no connection between the people 
and the emerging political system and resulted in elections the country was not ready for. This 
led to illegitimate institutions, and institutions that from the start could not work properly 
because, aside from being controlled by the ruling PDCI, were operating in an environment of 
oppressed political, social, and economic rights. In effect, Cote d’Ivoire encountered and failed 
to overcome three primary challenges to democracy discussed in the literature. While economic 
decline and liberalization were ruled out as decisive causal factors in Cote d’Ivoire failure, the 
fact that they were also present as a challenge only highlights how necessary it was Cote 
d’Ivoire navigate the remaining challenges to democracy and stability. Ghana on the other hand 
can be seen as encountering and successfully dealing with the major challenges to its 
democratic institutions. By creating a new political system prior to elections, it ironed out issues 
between the ruling elite and opposition before elections began. In doing so it managed to create 
a system that could effectively manage the multiple interests inherent in an ethnically 
heterogeneous society and create a system in widely supported by Ghanaians. In both cases, 
crucial turning points for democracy hinge on the decisions by their leaders on how to handle 
the evolving political system. In Ghana’s case, Rawlings investment in the new political order 
gave Ghana a chance at democracy. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, Bedie’s failure to handle 
political risk gave Cote d’Ivoire Ivoirite and civil war.  
It can be fairly stated that the consolidation of a stable democratic system in Ghana 
occurred at approximately the same time Cote d’Ivoire was taking its final breath. In Ghana 
after the elections of 2000 represented the first democratic change in power when John A. 
Kufuor of the NPP defeated the NDC’s John Atta-Mills, Rawlings successor, in both the 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections. This and the parliamentary elections were declared 
free and fair by the international community and the victory of the opposition and peaceful 
transfer of power represented a substantial step forward for Ghanaian democracy. The latest 
elections of 2008 saw eight candidates contest the presidency, none receiving more than 50 
percent of the vote. A run-off occurred between Mills and the NPP candidate Nana Akufo 
Addo. Mills won the election and was sworn into office in January of 2009. The latest elections 
are seen as another significant step towards democratic consolidation in Ghana. These elections 
represent the second peaceful transfer of power to the opposition since the start of the Fourth 
Republic.  
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 Simultaneous to Ghana’s peaceful transfer of power, Cote d’Ivoire was experiencing its 
first coup. Since General Guie’s coup in 1999 and Gbagbo’s rise to the Presidency in 2000, Cote 
d’Ivoire has yet to hold successful national elections. Since the outbreak of civil war in 2002 the 
country has remained deeply divided between its Muslim North and Christian South. In 2003 
an attempt at reunification was made. A power-sharing arrangement between the government 
and the rebel New Forces was agreed upon. For the next two years repeated attempts were 
made to restart the disarmament process and hold new elections, but most ended 
unsuccessfully. In 2007 a new round of talks were held, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, 
which saw Guillaume Soro, leader of the New Forces sworn in as prime minister. In 2007 
registration of voters commenced as birth certificates were issued to those who were previously 
undocumented. However elections, which were originally scheduled for November of 2008, 
were postponed nearly two years because of voter registration issues. The elections held in 
Novermber 2010 saw Alassane Ouattara of the RDR elected president. However, former 
President Gbagbo refused to cede power and simultaneously swore himself in as president. As 
of present, Gbagbo refuses to step down and the Ivorian economy is reaching a crisis point due 
constant conflict. The cease-fire between rebel and government forces was also breached and 
the fighting has resumed.  
Conclusion  
 What drives democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa? This study attempts to 
answer that question by not only considering institutional choices, but also the factors that 
influence how these institutions work. The results from the first part of this study show that, for 
the year 2010, those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing were associated 
with greater democracy and stability. While it lay beyond the scope of this study, a crucial next 
step in the study of these institutions is their duration. Do they stand the test of time in states 
with high levels of ethnic fractionalization? Or are they prone to failure as critics suggest? 
 As emphasized earlier, even the right institutions do not always produce stable 
democratic systems. Institutions must operate within the conditions present in a state, 
regardless of how favorable or unfavorable they might be. Therefore, while it might be possible 
to craft institutions that provide a state with best chances at democracy and stability, the 
political elite and people of that country must still contend with contextual factors. The cases of 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, with similar institutions and lower levels of power-sharing provide 
examples of how these intervening factors influence the operation of institutions, and that these 
factors, not the institutions were the casual factors in determining democratic outcomes. The 
failure of the elite in Cote d’Ivoire at the time of democratization to construct a new, legitimate, 
and inclusive political system has had devastating consequences. Ghana’s Fourth Republic has 
overcome these obstacles with a new constitution and elite’s willingness to accept the risks of 
democracy.  
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It might appear at first glance that the findings from the first part of the study are 
contradictory to the finding from the second part. However this is not the case. The first part 
shows that there appear to be sets of institutions more conducive to democracy and stability in 
sub-Saharan Africa, while the case studies of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire highlight the 
consequences of contextual factors on democratic institutions. Together these show that when 
politicians go about constructing political institutions, or when political scientists study the 
causes for democratic success, they must not only consider which set of institutions are best in 
light of conditions within the country, but also how the conditions of the country in question 
might influence the working of these institutions.  
Institutions are ‘sticky,’ as they say, and the stronger these institutions the more they 
tend to influence how politicians behave. Often in sub-Saharan Africa these institutions are 
admittedly weak and therefore the political elite do not always adhere to institutional rules. By 
conducting an in-depth study of the aforementioned cases, it can be seen that the choices made 
by political elites is an ever present specter in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, while there are 
many factors to consider, the creation of an inclusive political system, which effectively 
manages groups in conflict is also of utmost importance, after which the benefits of electoralism 
can be fully utilized. With that being said this study takes a critical step forward in determining 
which set of institutions are most likely to produce stable democracies, those of power-sharing, 
and which factors, from among many, influence the success or failure of democratic institutions 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Appendix 
List of Sub-Saharan States, Scores, System Type, and Region 
Country FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Electoral 
System 
Executive Decentralization Region 
Angola 5.5 83.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Central 
Benin 2 76.8 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Botswana 2.5 68.6 5 Maj. Par. Unitary Southern 
Burkina Faso 4 90.7 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Burundi 4.5 96.7 5 PR Pres Unitary Eastern 
Cameroon 6 95.4 5 Maj. Semi Decentralized 
Union 
Central 
Cape Verde 1 77.2 7 PR Par. Unitary Western 
CAR 5 106.4 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Chad 6.5 113.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Comoros 3.5 85.1 5 Maj. Pres. Federal Eastern 
DRC 6 109.9 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Central 
RofC 5.5 92.5 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Cote d’Ivoire 5.5 101.2 4 Maj.  Semi Unitary Western 
Djibouti 5 81.9 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
7 88.5 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Eritrea 7 93.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Ethiopia 5 98.8 7 Maj. Par. Federal Eastern 
Gabon 5.5 75.3 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Central 
Gambia 5 80.2 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Ghana 1.5 67.1 4 Maj. Pres. Decentralized 
Union 
Western 
Guinea 6.5 105 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Western 
Guinea-
Bissau 
4 97.2 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Kenya 4 100.7 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Lesotho 3 82.2 6 MMP Par. Unitary Southern 
Liberia 3.5 91.7 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Western 
Madagascar 5 82.6 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Malawi 3.5 93.6 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
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Country FH Score FSI Score PSI Score Electoral 
System 
Executive Decentralization Region 
Mali 2.5 79.3 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Mauritania 5.5 89.1 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Western 
Mauritius 2 44.4 5 Maj. Par. Unitary Eastern 
Mozambique 3.5 81.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Namibia 2 74.5 6 PR Pres. Decentralized 
Union 
Southern 
Niger 4.5 97.8 6 PR Semi Unitary Western 
Nigeria 4.5 100.2 5 Maj. Pres. Federal Western 
Rwanda 5.5 88.7 5 PR Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
2 75.8 7 PR Par. Unitary Central 
Senegal 3 74.6 5 MMP Semi Unitary Western 
Seychelles 3 67.9 4 MMP Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Sierra Leone 3 93.6 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Somalia 7 114.3 0 N/A N/A N/A Eastern 
South Africa 2 67.9 9 PR Par. Federal Southern 
Sudan 7 111.8 4 N/A Pres. Federal Eastern 
Swaziland 6 82.8 2 Maj. N/A Unitary Southern 
Tanzania 3.5 81.2 4 Maj. Pres. Decentralized 
Union 
Eastern 
Togo 4.5 88.1 5 PR Pres. Unitary Western 
Uganda 4.5 97.5 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Zambia 3.5 83.9 3 Maj. Pres. Unitary Eastern 
Zimbabwe 6 110.2 4 Maj. Semi Unitary Eastern 
Sub-Saharan States, Freedom House Scores, Failed States Index Scores, System Types, and Region.              
Source(s): State Department Bureau of African Affairs; Freedom House 2010; Failed States Index 2010; 
CIA World Factbook; UN Definition of Regions; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007. www.state.gov; 
www.freedomhouse.org; www.foreignpolicy.com; www.cia.gov; www.un.org. 
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Power-sharing Index Table (PSI) 
Score Electoral System 
(Lower House) 
 
Executive Decentralization 
3 
 
Proportional 
Representation 
Parliamentary Federal 
2 
 
Mixed Member 
Proportional 
Semi-Presidential Decentralized Union 
1 
 
Majoritarian 
(Plurality/FPTP w/ 
Presidential Unitary 
0 
 
Appointed or non-
existent 
Monarchy or Appointed Failed State 
Power-sharing Index (PSI). Source(s): CIA World Factbook; Political Handbook of Africa: 2007.  
www.cia.gov.       
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i The regions are defined using the UN’s definitions of regions, with three exceptions. First, Sudan is 
considered part of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet under the UN’s classification is part of Northern Africa. For 
the purposes of including it in the study I choose to group it with Eastern Africa because of its location 
and proximity to other East African states. The next two exceptions are Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 
Both of these states are defined as being part of Eastern Africa. However upon further review and 
consultation I chose to include them as part of Southern Africa. This is due to their geographic location 
and because without these two cases Southern Africa would have been comprised of a mere five states.  
 
ii Freedom House, an independent think tank based in the United States began assessing political trends 
in the 1950s. In 1972 it switched to the Gastil Index which assigns ratings of the political rights and civil 
liberties for each state and then categorizes them as free, partially free, or not free. The index tracks the 
existence of political rights by looking at the electoral processes, political pluralism, and the functioning 
of government. Civil liberties are measured in terms of the existence of freedom of speech and 
association, rule of law, and personal rights. The classifications are based on a checklist of questions, 
which includes ten separate items that relate to the existence of political rights and fifteen items 
concerning civil liberties. These items assess the institutional checks and balances of power on the 
executive by the legislature, an independent judiciary, and the existence of political rights and civil 
liberties. These also include self-determination and participation by minorities, and free and fair elections 
laws. Each item is given a score from 0-4 and all are equal when combined. The raw scores of a country 
are then converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. These two 
scores are then combined to determine the average rating of a state and whether it is free, partly free, or 
not free (Freedom House).  
 Although it provides scores for nearly all states and independent territories as well as being a 
long running time-series of observations, there are several flaws and biases. First the process used by 
Freedom House suffers from lack of transparency, so it is impossible to check the reliability and 
consistency of coding decisions. The items used to measure political rights and civil liberties also cover a 
wide range of issues, some of which might not necessarily be indicative of democracy. Since no 
breakdown of the composite scores is made available it is impossible to test which of the items correlate 
most with democracy. While it is biased in the sense that it measures only liberal democracy, it is widely 
used and trusted as providing an accurate representation of a states’ level of democracy (Norris 2008; 
Munck & Verkulen 2002). 
 
iii
 The ranking a state receives is based on the total combined scores of these twelve indicators. Each 
indicator is measured on a scale from 0-10, with zero being the most stable and ten being the most 
unstable. These indicators are then combined to form a scale from 0-120 in which higher scores indicate 
more instability. The CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed over the past decade by independent 
scholars, educational, government, and private institutions (Fund for Peace). Since the ratings are meant 
to measure the vulnerability of a state they cannot predict when a state might collapse or experience 
violence. Although the trend lines that these scores produce may be used as a means of determining the 
future direction of a state. Unfortunately the raw data used in creating these rankings is not readily 
available due to it being drawn from millions of news articles and reports. However the index values are 
readily available to the public. 
